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RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: RAWLSIAN
CONSIDERATIONS
Tommie Shelby*
Philosophy may study political questions at many different levels of
generality and abstractness, all valuable and significant.... I don't
say that the more general questions are the more philosophical, nor
that they are more important. All these questions and their answers,
so far as we can find them, bear on one another and work together
to add to the knowledge of philosophy.1
Some political philosophers and legal theorists, including Anita
Allen and Seana Shiffrin in this volume, have expressed puzzlement
and disappointment that Rawls does not take up questions of racial
justice more explicitly and at greater length in his seminal writings on
social justice.2  When liberal thinkers make this complaint they
generally do not mean to deny what is no doubt obvious to anyone
who has studied Rawls's work, namely, that he was concerned about
racial problems and that this concern influenced how he constructed
and defended his theory. For example, the formal and substantive
dimensions of Rawls's theory, properly understood and applied,
would arguably rule out most if not all familiar forms of racial
injustice. Moreover, his theory would seem to have important
implications for contemporary problems of race-such as the
permissibility of racial profiling, the fairness of affirmative action, and
the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes. Nevertheless, it is
certainly true that Rawls does not himself draw out these implications
or elaborate upon them.
There are also some questions of racial justice that Rawls treats as
simply outside the purview of his main theoretical concerns. Rawls is
primarily interested in the principles that would regulate a well-
ordered society. Within such a society, all are presumed to act justly
and to do their part in upholding just institutions. Or as he sometimes
puts it, "strict compliance is one of the stipulations of the original
* Assistant Professor of African and African American Studies and of Social Studies,
Harvard University. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay, warm
thanks go to Erin Kelly, Jon Mandle, Charles Mills, and Tim Scanlon, and for
research assistance and discussion, I thank Ryan White.
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism lxi (paperback ed. 1996).
2. See Anita L. Allen, Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1677 (2004);
Seana Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 1643 (2004).
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position; the principles of justice are chosen on the supposition that
they will be generally complied with."3  He does not give much
attention to partial compliance theory, which studies the principles
that govern how we should respond to or rectify injustice. But of
course many of the most vexing and urgent questions of racial justice
fall within the domain of partial compliance theory.4 For example,
this domain would include questions of compensatory justice for past
racial wrongs and what to do about the persistence of racial
discrimination in housing and employment. Indeed, Rawls's relative
silence on issues of race and his focus on ideal theory has led even
some critics to be skeptical of the potential of his theoretical
framework to further our understanding of the problem of racial
injustice, leading them to opt for an alternative theoretical structure.
While it is true that Rawls's explicit remarks about racism and racial
disadvantage are sparse, what he does say can still aid those of us who
do focus our theoretical energies on questions of racial justice. In fact,
some of his insights may prove to be indispensable for such projects.
In this Essay I highlight and extend Rawls's admittedly all too few
remarks about race. I emphasize the significance of Rawls's main
subject-the justice of the basic structure-for such important
questions as how to address institutional racism, the legacy of past
racial injustice, and the persistence of individual racist attitudes in civil
society. Though the discussion that follows is necessarily only a brief
sketch, I hope to better enable us to appreciate the significance of
Rawls's theory for evaluating the racial justice of social arrangements
and thereby to point the way toward, and hopefully to encourage,
future research in this area.6 Some familiarity with the basic features
of Rawls's theory is assumed.
I. CONSIDERED CONVICTIONS AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
Rawls states that among our pre-theoretic considered convictions is
the belief that racial discrimination is unjust.7 While such convictions
can of course be revised as we seek wide and general reflective
equilibrium, they function as "provisional fixed points" that allow us
3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 39, at 215 (rev. ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
4. Rawls would seem to concede this point. See id. § 2, at 7-8; Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 1, at xxx.
5. See, e.g., Charles W. Mills, White Supremacy and Racial Justice, in From Class
to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism 195-218 (2003).
6. Though far too few, there have been other efforts to demonstrate the
relevance of Rawls's theory for questions of racial justice. See, e.g., Bernard R. Boxill,
Blacks and Social Justice 212-25 (rev. ed. 1992); Michele M. Moody-Adams, Race,
Class, and the Social Construction of Self-Respect, 24 Phil. F. 251 (1992-93); Howard
McGary, Race and Social Justice (1999); Laurence Thomas, Self-Respect: Theory and
Practice, in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy
from 1917, at 174-89 (Leonard Harris ed., 1983).
7. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 4, at 17-18.
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to construct our interpretation of the original position and thereby to
gain greater clarity about, and to increase our confidence in, our most
basic general principles. In this way, Rawls treats the belief that racial
discrimination is unjust-like the belief that slavery is unjust-as
among our firmest moral convictions, which the principles of justice
should account for and be in accord with.' This substantive judgment
about racial justice is thus a key ingredient in justice as fairness, his
preferred liberal conception of justice. So while. I agree with Shiffrin
that race has something of a strange presence in Rawls's theory-both
central and peripheral-there can be no doubt that the role it plays
has a significant influence on the content of the two principles: The
conviction that racial discrimination is unjust helps to shape Rawls's
sense of what is morally relevant and what is morally arbitrary from
the standpoint of social justice.
For instance, considerations of racial disadvantage have a role to
play in the construction of the veil of ignorance. As Allen and Shiffrin
rightly note, the parties in the original position are excluded from
knowing the racial identity of those they represent.' It is instructive to
see exactly why this is so, as some commentators have misunderstood
the point of this restriction.' ° Recall that the parties in the original
position must evaluate principles solely on the basis of general
considerations, not particular contingent facts about existing persons
or societies." The rationale is that "[i]f a knowledge of particulars is
allowed, then the outcome [of the choice situation] is biased by
[morally] arbitrary contingencies."' 2 Thus, the parties must not know
the contingencies, social or natural, that would put them in conflict or
that would give some a superior bargaining advantage. In particular,
in the original position the parties do not know the class position,
social status, or occupation of those they represent; nor do they know
their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities (e.g.,
native intelligence, strength, imagination, etc.).
Now whether we understand "race" as a status designation in a
social hierarchy, a socially constructed identity, or a natural division of
the human species-and for our purposes here I will remain agnostic
on this question-this constraint of general considerations would
entail that the parties do not know the racial identity of those they
8. See also Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 8.
9. In Political Liberalism, Rawls explicitly states that the representatives in the
original position are not to know the race or ethnicity of those they represent. Id. at
24-25; see also John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 15 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
10. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 96-116
(1990); Charles W. Mills, Race and the Social Contract Tradition, 6 Soc. Identities 441,
451-53 (2000).
11. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 24, at 118-19.
12. Id. §29, at 122; see Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at
15-16; Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 23.
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represent. The parties should not know whether they are members of
an advantaged or disadvantaged racial caste, regardless of whether
these advantages and disadvantages were the result of social
circumstances, the "natural" traits and tendencies of different racial
groups, or both. Nor do the parties know the particular circumstances
of their own society: "[T]hey do not know its economic or political
situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to
achieve."13 So, for instance, they do not know whether their society
has a history of racism or is currently plagued by racial strife; they do
not know the racial demographics of their society. Nor do they know
the relative social status or class advantage of the racial groups in their
society. The parties are also excluded from knowing their particular
conception of the good or their peculiar psychological tendencies.
Thus, they do not know whether their attitudes toward their own
racial identity or that of others will be positive, negative, or neutral;
nor do they know if their determinate conception of the good includes
enduring attachment or loyalty to the members of their own race.
By depriving the parties of the particular facts and contingencies
that have historically put individuals and groups into conflict, Rawls
rules out the selection of a range of principles that would entail,
encourage, or exacerbate racial injustice. Since the parties do not
know their racial identity or the relative social position of the various
racial populations, they have no rational basis for choosing principles
that would favor one race over another. Given the thickness of the
veil, Rawls contends that no party in the original position would "put
forward the principle that basic rights should depend on the color of
one's skin or the texture of one's hair. No one can tell whether such
principles would be to his advantage."' 4 Indeed, he goes further:
Inevitably, then, racial and sexual discrimination presupposes that
some hold a favored place in the social system which they are willing
to exploit to their advantage. From the standpoint of persons
similarly situated in an initial situation which is fair, the principles of
explicit racist doctrines are not only unjust. They are irrational. For
this reason we could say that they are not moral conceptions at all,
but simply means of suppression. They have no place on a
reasonable list of traditional conceptions of justice.15
Thus it is a mistake to think, as some have, that abstraction from the
social realities of race within the contractarian model is necessarily a
way of obfuscating or denying the centrality of racial domination to
the historical development of modern societies. 6 On the contrary,
within Rawls's theory this abstraction insures that racial bias is not
codified in or further entrenched by our shared conception of justice.
13. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 24, at 118.
14. Id. at 129.
15. Id. at 129-30.
16. See Mills, supra note 10, at 451.
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It is precisely because there are unjustified racial inequalities that the
parties in the original position are prevented from knowing the racial
identity of those they represent.
II. RACE, PERSONHOOD, AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
It is a central if not defining tenet of liberalism that all persons are
to be regarded as free and equal in a just society. Within
contractarian versions of liberalism (as opposed to, say, utilitarian
accounts), the parties to the social contract choose the terms of their
association based on the presumption that each regards all others as
free and equal persons. Charles Mills has argued, however, that
classical liberal contractarianism (i.e., the political philosophy
pioneered by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant), while explicitly affirming
the equal moral personhood of all humans, implicitly and perhaps
surreptitiously extends equal moral status to whites only, specifically
white men.17 He suggests that in the socio-historical context within
which these theories of justice were initially articulated, there existed
a "racial subtext," a kind of racial background knowledge that
assumed that the parties to the social contract are really only white
people, as only these individuals were widely regarded as full moral
persons at the time. Non-white racial groups were tacitly and
sometimes explicitly excluded, as they were regarded as moral sub-
persons. To regard non-whites as sub-persons is not necessarily to
deny their humanity-though it arguably comes quite close. 8 Rather,
it is to regard them as falling below some threshold for complete
personhood, as lacking the capacities necessary for full participation
in social life on the basis of equal civic standing. It is to conceive their
status as similar or analogous to the severely disabled, the mentally ill,
or children who never mature and thus never develop adequately
their capacities as rationally autonomous agents. In short, it is to
regard normal, non-white adults as inferior or degraded persons.
Those "liberal" whites who regard non-white peoples in this way are
naturally led to take up paternalistic or worse attitudes toward such
peoples. Mills therefore suggests that the social contract tradition
includes an intellectual legacy that implicitly affirms white supremacy,
a legacy that, if not forthrightly confronted, threatens to weaken if not
undermine the validity of the normative prescriptions of
17. See Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract 15-17, 55-59 (1997). On this same
theme but in a less iconoclastic fashion, Allen says, "[T]he contractarian intellectual
tradition is not inherently liberal. As an historical matter, famous social contract
theorists have not had a lot to say about race or the betterment of disadvantaged
racial minorities, and what they have had to say has often been disheartening." Allen,
supra note 2, at 1678.
18. See Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,
61 J. Phil. 628-41 (1964), reprinted in Race and Racism 180-92 (Bernard Boxill ed.,
2001).
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contemporary liberal political philosophy. 9 Accordingly, Mills urges a
form of political theory that engages the history of global white
supremacy in a more thorough and serious manner than
contemporary liberal theorists have so far been willing to do.
Mills's argument should be taken seriously, though unfortunately
few liberal political philosophers have chosen to engage with it. I
regret to say that I will not take it up here in any detail either, except
to show that Rawls, as an heir to the legacy of classical liberal
contractarianism, is not vulnerable to the charge of implicitly
endorsing white supremacy or the racial status quo. In fact, Rawls's
theory explicitly rules out regarding the members of any racial group
as anything less than full moral persons. According to Rawls, all
legitimate conceptions of justice must satisfy certain formal
constraints: generality, universality, publicity, ordering, and finality."z
Although perhaps each of these constraints has implications for
problems of racial justice, I here focus on the constraint of
universality. It holds that principles of justice must apply to everyone
in virtue of their being moral persons.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that moral persons have two
characteristics: (1) "they are capable of having (and are assumed to
have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of
life)"; and (2) "they are capable of having (and are assumed to
acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to
act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum
degree.",2' Rawls maintains that the capacity for moral personality "is
a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 22 (He leaves
aside the question of whether the capacity for moral personality is also
a necessary condition.) No claim about the degree to which normal,
adult persons embody or realize the powers of moral personality can
justify unequal justice. From the standpoint of social justice, then,
there is no distinction to be made between complete and incomplete
moral persons, i.e., there are no sub-persons in a legitimate
conception of justice. Now not only does Rawls assume that the
overwhelming majority of humankind are moral persons in his sense,
but he explicitly denies that any race is without the capacity for moral
personality: "There is no race or recognized group of human beings
that lacks this attribute. '23 Indeed, he urges that we simply assume
that the requirement of a capacity for moral personality is always met,
noting that to suppose otherwise would be imprudent, as this could
19. Mills, supra note 17, at 30-31.
20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, at 112-18.
21. Id. at 442.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 77, at 443.
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lead to injustice.24 Thus it is quite clear that, within justice as fairness,
the principles of justice apply equally to all regardless of race.
The principle of equal justice regardless of race is also firmly
secured in Political Liberalism, where Rawls explicitly defends a
strictly political (as opposed to a metaphysical) conception of justice
and a corresponding political conception of persons. A political
conception of justice aims to be, as far as possible, independent of
contested and incompatible, comprehensive philosophical, moral, and
religious doctrines, as these controversial views cannot form the basis
for reasoned, informed, and voluntary political agreement among
citizens in a democratic society. Instead, the content of a political
conception of justice should be derived solely from fundamental ideas,
values, and principles that are implicit in what Rawls calls the "public
political culture" of a democratic society. This public culture is
composed of "the political institutions of a constitutional regime and
the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the
judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common
knowledge. '26  The public political culture of a society is to be
distinguished from its "background culture," which includes all sorts
of comprehensive doctrines, the many beliefs, norms, and practices of
everyday social life, and the internal cultures of various associations in
civil society. Moreover, a political conception of justice is to rest on
currently accepted general beliefs and modes of reasoning as
understood in common sense, along with the methods and conclusions
of science provided these are uncontroversial. This conscious move
away from relying on controversial views is part of Rawls's effort to
defend a conception of justice that satisfies the demand for political
legitimacy given the existence in society of a plurality of reasonable
but conflicting and incommensurable doctrines.28
Against this background, Rawls contends that the familiar tradition
of democratic thought, as implicit in our public political culture and
according to current canons of interpretation, enjoins us to regard all
citizens as free and equal persons. This means that all persons who
are capable of citizenship-i.e., all who can fully participate in a fair
system of social cooperation over a complete life-should be treated
as free and equal.29 As in A Theory of Justice, participation in a fair
system of cooperation requires a sense of justice and the capacity to
develop a rational plan of life (to formulate, revise, and rationally
pursue a conception of the good). But now, given our primary aim of
24. Id.
25. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 11-15.
26. Id. at 13-14; see also id. at 220-22.
27. Id. at 224-25.
28. Id. at 134-40, 216-27.
29. Id. at 18-22, 299-302; see also Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra
note 9, at 170-71.
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developing a political conception of justice, Rawls insists that we
assume that all normal human beings (i.e., those without severe
disabilities or mental disorders) have these two moral powers, along
with the capacity for reason, i.e., judgment, thought, and inference,
needed to exercise these powers. There is no basis in shared political
values or in uncontroversial, well-established scientific findings to
maintain that there is a known race of humankind-should "races"
exist, in any meaningful sense, at all-that is incapable of citizenship.
Thus Rawls holds that within a political conception of justice all
persons, regardless of their racial identity, should be regarded as free
and equal.
Now it might be argued that Rawls's exclusive reliance on ideas that
are implicit in our public political culture actually supports Mills's
contention that contractarian liberal political philosophy implicitly
endorses the view that non-whites are sub-persons and thus not due
equal justice. After all, many of the "founding fathers" of our
democratic institutions and many of the authors of canonical founding
texts in the democratic tradition (including the framers of the U.S.
Constitution) had racist views, were apologists for slavery, held slaves
themselves, or advocated the resettlement of black Americans to
Africa or elsewhere outside the United States.30 Moreover, at the
founding of these institutions and the publication of these historical
documents, many, if not most, citizens of would-be democratic
regimes would have interpreted the core elements of their public
political culture as excluding non-whites (and white women) from the
status of equal citizenship.
Yet, Rawls does not enjoin us to interpret our public culture from
the standpoint of its founders, as if the object of our inquiry were to
discern their conception of justice. Rather, he argues that, in our
ambition to arrive at a shared political conception of justice, we-
those of us currently seeking clarification about what justice requires
for a democratic society-should interpret the fundamental ideas and
principles latent in our public political culture from our own
standpoint, i.e., "here and now."'" The hypocritical and racist
interpretations of the democratic tradition by some of the founders of
our democratic institutions must be ignored given the primary aim of
political liberalism, "to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a
reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political
questions."32  A political conception of justice that rested on such
perverse interpretations of our democratic ideals could not possibly be
reasonably acceptable to non-white citizens, and thus could not form a
public basis of justification.
30. See Mills, supra note 17, at 20-31, 59-62, 64-72.
31. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 22-28.
32. Id. at xxi.
33. Compare Glenn Loury's response to Mills's argument in Glenn C. Loury, The
1704 [Vol. 72
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III. FORMAL JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
As is well known, Rawls contends that the subject of a political
conception of justice is the configuration of the fundamental
institutions of society, what he calls the "basic structure," not
individuals and their actions in particular circumstances.34  He
characterizes an institution as "a public system of rules which defines
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and
immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action
as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain
penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur."35
According to Rawls, there are at least two ways of thinking about an
institution: (1) as a possible form of conduct expressed by a public
system of rules (an institution as an abstract object); or (2) as the
realization of these rules in the thought and conduct of particular
persons (an institution as realized). Rawls maintains that it is best to
conceive of questions of social justice in the second sense, as applying
to institutions as realized. Moreover, we should assume that these
realized institutions will be "effectively and impartially
administered."36 This means that we should take up the question of
the substantive justice of an institutional arrangement on the
assumption that in practice it will be formally just.
Formal justice, or what Rawls sometimes calls "justice as
regularity," is the "impartial and consistent administration of laws and
institutions, whatever their substantive principles."37  When formal
justice obtains, the officials and administrators who operate on the
basis of institutionally defined authority treat similar cases similarly
(where the relevant similarities and differences are specified by the
existing rules of the institution), and they regularly adhere to and
properly interpret the institutional rules and procedures. While talk
of "formal" justice might suggest that this principle is somehow trivial
(or worse) from an egalitarian point of view, Rawls rightly insists that
it rules out significant forms of injustice; not just de jure but de facto.
For example, formal justice in the case of legal institutions is a
component of the rule of law.38 Thus, it is unjust when judges fail to
apply the appropriate law or to interpret it correctly. The kinds of
injustice that Rawls mainly has in mind here include "the subtle
distortions of prejudice and bias as these effectively discriminate
Anatomy of Racial Inequality 118-21 (2002). But see Charles W. Mills, The "Racial
Contract" as Methodology, in From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and
Black Radicalism 248-49 (2003) (offering Mills's brief reply).
34. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 257-88.
35. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, §10, at 47-48.
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id. § 10, at 51; see id. at 206-07.
38. Id. § 38, at 206-13.
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against certain groups in the judicial process."39 He surely means to
include racial prejudice and bias among the distortions that lead to
unfair discrimination in the administration of justice.
We can also assess the formal justice of many non-legal institutions
in society, for justice as regularity applies to all institutions that are
components of the basic structure. The administration of these social
institutions, too, is susceptible to corruption or distortion by prejudice
and bias. Indeed, I would suggest that we conceptualize one
important form of "institutional racism" in just this way. We can
think of a social institution-e.g., a criminal justice system-as
embodying institutional racism when the administration or
enforcement of its rules and procedures is frequently distorted by the
racial prejudice and bias of its officials. Such prejudice and bias need
not operate on the basis of crude racial stereotypes, but may be more
subtle, implicit, or even unconscious. Nor is it necessary that such
prejudice and bias spring from malicious motives or hatred. Whatever
the degree of individual blameworthiness of officials who possess
these skewed perceptions and attitudes, when the influence of racial
prejudice and bias on decision-makers causes them to misapply
institutional rules or to fail to properly enforce these rules, we are
dealing with a form of racial injustice. It is also important to
recognize that these decisions would violate formal justice even if the
content of the system of rules were more or less in accord with the
substantive principles of justice. Thus, we might say, drawing on
Rawls's idea of formal justice, that when the distorting effects of racial
prejudice and bias pervade the operation of an institution, the
institution as realized is itself unjust, notwithstanding the justice of its
rules and procedures when viewed abstractly.
IV. FOUR-STAGE SEQUENCE AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES
Now Shiffrin would, I think, concede that Rawls has the
aforementioned theoretical resources at his disposal and thus can rule
out many forms of racial injustice without revising the basic
framework of his theory. But she wonders why he does not simply
include an explicit antidiscrimination provision in his two principles,
and argues that his conception of justice would be improved if such a
provision were incorporated.
In order to offer a Rawlsian reply, we should observe that Rawls
does not assume that once the two principles of justice are chosen we
will then judge all claims of justice from this abstract point of view.
Rather, he suggests that we think of the principles as applied in a
several-stage sequence, where "[e]ach stage is to represent an
39. Id. § 38, at 207.
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appropriate point of view from which certain kinds of questions are
considered."40
In the second stage (after the principles of justice have been agreed
to in the original position), the parties, now called delegates, should
move to the constitutional stage. Constrained by the principles
already chosen, they select a system of constitutional powers of
government and the basic rights of citizens. At this stage, the veil of
ignorance is partially lifted. The delegates to the constitutional
convention still do not know their social status, class position, natural
assets, or determinate conception of the good. But they now know
the general facts about their society-its natural resources, level of
economic advance, political culture, and so on. They also know "the
beliefs and interests that men in the system are liable to have and of
the political tactics that they will find it rational to use given their
circumstances. "41
Though Rawls does not say as much, it seems clear that among the
general facts of their society to which the delegates would have access
at the constitutional stage are: (1) whether racial identity engenders
conflict in the society; (2) whether there are some in the society who
have, or who are prone to develop, racist beliefs and attitudes; and (3)
whether some racial groups in the society are or have been politically,
socially, or economically disadvantaged because of racism. If the
answer to any of these questions is affirmative, then given that the
delegates do not know the racial identity or relative social position of
those they represent, it would be rational for them to select
constitutional provisions that explicitly prohibit racial discrimination
in the institutions of the basic structure, and even to grant special
powers to the government to insure that all citizens, regardless of their
race, receive the equal protection of the law. This seems all the more
clear once we recognize that Rawls would have the delegates at the
constitutional stage "select from among the procedural arrangements
that are both just and feasible those which are most likely to lead to a
just and effective legal order. '42 Given the tragic history of genocide,
chattel slavery, and other forms of racial violence and domination in
the modern era, such special provisions to combat racial
discrimination and to affirm the equal citizenship of racial minorities
are needed in most, if not all, democratic societies. The long struggle
to overcome racial barriers to equal citizenship, which reaches back at
least to the abolitionist movement against slavery, has shaped our
public political culture, for example, through various constitutional
amendments. Moreover, these hard won victories of the civil rights
40. Id. § 31, at 172; see Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 334-40. For a
particularly helpful discussion of Rawls's idea of the four-stage sequence, see Jon
Mandle, Having It Both Ways, 75 Pac. Phil. Q. 295-317 (1994).
41. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 31, at 174.
42. Id. § 31, at 173.
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movement help to reinforce our sense that the injustice of racial
discrimination can operate as a fixed point as we seek to arrive at a
shared political conception of justice. But these are all contingent
facts about the history of existing modern democracies. A theory of
justice that is meant to apply to all societies in the circumstances of
justice should not build in the peculiar features of particular
constitutional regimes, not because these lessons are not ones that we
all can learn from, as no doubt we can, but because then we could not
be sure that the most fundamental principles of our philosophical
theory are sufficiently general in form and universal in application.
Shiffrin might agree that a principle that explicitly prohibited racial
discrimination is too specific to be included at the highest level of
generality in our conception of justice. But she nevertheless insists
that Rawls should simply include a general, positive antidiscrimination
principle within the two principles of justice, preferably at the highest
level of priority. After all, we know that in any pluralistic society
there is likely to be some disfavored out-group(s), routinely victimized
by discrimination. She argues that the parties in the original position,
knowing of the tendency of identity-based forms of domination and
exclusion to develop in systems of social cooperation, would naturally
choose an antidiscrimination principle in order to protect citizens
from such arbitrary discriminatory treatment.
However, Rawls's two principles, understood within his wider
theoretical framework, can accommodate these concerns without
further complicating the two principles. As I have argued above, both
de jure and de facto discriminatory treatment of citizens is already
prohibited by the joint commitment to equal citizenship and formal
justice, including the rule of law. No citizen is to be subject to partial
or arbitrary treatment by the institutions of the basic structure, but
rather all are to be regarded as free and equal persons who are
entitled to equal justice. There will of course be specific forms of
discrimination that will be prevalent in some societies, and thus those
societies will want to take extra measures, perhaps even constitutional
provisions, to deal effectively with these and other social problems
that undermine the proper regulation of just institutions and that deny
some citizens their equal basic liberties and fair opportunities.
Apart from affirming equal protection and formal justice, or
perhaps introducing historically contingent factors in order to apply
the principles of justice in particular circumstances, it is not clear to
me that we can give content to the idea of "general discriminatory
treatment." Discrimination, as we have come to understand this thick
concept, is not simply a matter of arbitrary or inconsistent treatment,
regardless of whether such unfair treatment is intentional. Rather,
discrimination is at work when a characteristic (or set of
characteristics) possessed by or ascribed to the members of a social
group is widely but wrongly treated as a source of disvalue,
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incompetence, or inferiority. 3  Thus discrimination is never
discrimination in general, but discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
gender, religion, sexuality, or some other (real or merely ascribed)
human characteristic. When prejudice against such groups is
sufficiently widespread or entrenched, we will of course want to affirm
publicly our collective commitment to the protection of citizens of
these groups from unfair treatment, not only through constitutional
and legislative means, but through more informal means as well, such
as organized public protest and persistent moral criticism.
V. RACIAL DISADVANTAGE AND FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
In applying the two principles of justice to the basic structure of a
society, Rawls would have us evaluate the society's system of public
rules from the standpoint of certain representative positions defined
by that structure. We evaluate how well the system of social
cooperation satisfies the principle of equal liberty and the principle of
fair equality of opportunity from the position of equal citizenship. We
evaluate how well the system satisfies the difference principle from
the position of the least advantaged group. In a well-ordered society
that is effectively regulated by the principle of equal citizenship (i.e.,
where the basic liberties and fair opportunities of all citizens are
equally secure), the position of the least advantaged is defined, not by
their racial identity, but by their place in the distribution of income
and wealth, that is, by their class position.' Here, again, we assume
that the principle of formal justice is observed, such that the equal
civic status of persons is not diminished by the prejudice and bias-
racial or otherwise-of public officials. Under these circumstances,
the worst off in society (i.e., those with the lowest expectation of
primary goods over their lives) will be those in the lowest
socioeconomic position. Rawls should not be understood as asserting
here that racial disadvantage is, or can be reduced to, class
disadvantage. Racism, from a Rawlsian point of view, is an insult to
human dignity and unjust in its own right, for example, in its denial of
equal citizenship on morally arbitrary grounds. Further, racism
creates peculiar forms of disadvantage that are not strictly speaking a
matter of socioeconomic disadvantage, for instance, in its tendency to
produce in its victims a diminished sense of their own worth as
persons.45
But Rawls also allows that it may be necessary to assess some social
systems from the standpoint of other social positions, such as those
determined by some "fixed natural characteristic," e.g., sex, caste, or
43. See Adrian M.S. Piper, Two Kinds of Discrimination, in Race and Racism 193-
237 (Bernard Boxill ed., 2001).
44. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 16, at 81-84.
45. See Boxill, supra note 6, at 186-204. See generally Moody-Adams, supra note 6.
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race. This approach might be required in a society that lacks a
political conception of equal citizenship, or when social conditions are
so unfavorable in a given society that an effective and stable system of
equal basic liberties cannot be established. If such a social system
assigns basic rights based on race and whites are favored in this
scheme, then these inequalities would be justified by the general
conception of justice (as opposed to the more stringent two principles
with their lexical ranking) only if they would be to the advantage of
non-whites and acceptable from their standpoint.46 Although he does
not elaborate on the point, Rawls maintains, surely correctly, that
such inequalities would rarely, if ever, be to the advantage of the least
favored. Thus we should assume that in a just society race would not
define a relevant social position for specifying the least advantaged.
Rawls, so it would seem, is led to ignore racial characteristics in
articulating his theory of justice because he holds that racial
inequalities could only be the product of injustice. Moreover, Rawls
does not claim, contrary to Shiffrin's suggestion, that racial
discrimination (say, within education or the employment market)
should be evaluated from the standpoint of the difference principle (in
the special conception) or from the standpoint of the general
conception of justice.47 In a democratic constitutional regime, such
treatment would be ruled out by the requirements that all persons
who are capable of participating in a fair system of cooperation (and
here we assume this includes everyone) should be accorded equal
citizenship and that all offices and positions should be open to all
citizens under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. It is also
worth noticing that one need not accept the more controversial
difference principle in order to appreciate how racial discrimination is
incompatible with justice as fairness.48
In most modern democratic societies, however, many, though by no
means all, of the socioeconomic disadvantages that racial minorities
currently suffer are caused by racial injustice perpetrated in the past-
e.g., chattel slavery, genocide, land expropriation, colonization,
disenfranchisement, denial of basic liberties, relentless terrorism and
intimidation, and forced segregation. The racially disparate
distribution of income, wealth, and opportunities that currently
obtains in the United States, for example, can be partly explained by
the cumulative impact of this history of racial violence and
46. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 16, at 84-85, § 26, at 130-32.
47. Shiffrin says that in Justice as Fairness:
[Rawls] argues that inequitable treatment based on race would be
permissible if and only if it maximized the position of those disadvantaged
by such treatment. In other words he subjects discriminatory treatment to
the analysis of the second principle, while registering that it would almost
surely fail such a test.
Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 1660.
48. I owe this observation to Erin Kelly.
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domination.49 Past racism has led to the development of a class
structure in which the members of certain racial minorities (e.g.,
Native Americans and African Americans) are disproportionately
located in its lowest ranks. Given that ideal theory does not directly
address matters of compensatory justice, how, if at all, can Rawls's
theory be useful for addressing this injustice?
Here it is helpful to appreciate the richness of Rawls's fair equality
of opportunity principle. This principle, were it to be institutionally
realized in a well-ordered society in which the basic liberties were
secure and their fair value guaranteed, would mitigate, if not correct,
these race-based disadvantages by insuring that the life prospects of
racial minorities are not negatively affected by the economic legacy of
racial oppression. Rawls glosses the principle of fair equality of
opportunity this way:
[T]hose who are at the same level of [natural] talent and ability, and
have the same willingness to use them, should have the same
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social
system. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal
prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly
motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same
abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.
50
While I am not sure what set of institutional reforms would be
required to realize the principle of fair equality of opportunity in the
United States, it seems clear that it would require, at a minimum,
considerable redistribution of wealth, the expansion of educational
and employment opportunities, and aggressive measures to address
discrimination in employment, housing, and lending. My main point
here, though, is that a basic structure that provided fair equality of
opportunity for all citizens regardless of race would remove many of
the socioeconomic burdens that racial minorities presently shoulder
because of the history of racial injustice. Even though, as a member
of an historically disadvantaged racial group, one could not be sure
that one's current degree of wealth or income is not lower than it
would have been in the absence of our history of racial domination
(perhaps this is in principle unknowable), one could be sure that one's
life prospects will be roughly the same as that of others similarly gifted
and motivated regardless of the social position to which one has been
born. Rawls is not advocating mere formal equality here; nor is he
simply endorsing that familiar brand of American welfare liberalism
that emphasizes antidiscrimination law and an economic safety net,
49. See generally Dalton Conley, Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth,
and Social Policy in America (1999); Loury, supra note 33; Melvin L. Oliver &
Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial
Inequality (1995); William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks
and Changing American Institutions (2d ed. 1980).
50. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, § 12, at 63.
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but leaves a highly stratified system of class in place. Rawls not only
wants to see an end to discrimination and poverty, but he thinks a just
society is one where each has a fair chance to realize his or her
conception of the good, to carry out an autonomously arrived at
rational plan of life, without being inhibited in this pursuit by one's
race or class origin.
In this way, the fair equality of opportunity principle addresses one
of the most urgent concerns of members of the least favored races,
namely, to insure that their life prospects are not unfairly diminished
by the economic inequalities that have been created by a history of
racism. Were this principle institutionally realized and widely
recognized, it might also have the effect of sharply reducing the
resentment for past racial injustice that some members of
disadvantaged racial groups harbor, maybe even leading them to
reconsider their insistence on claims to reparations.5
VI. RACIST ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
As we have seen, the primary subject of social justice is, for Rawls,
the basic structure of society, and thus the principles of justice should
not be confused with the principles that regulate the conduct of
individuals in particular circumstances or the internal organization of
associations within society. But of course persons are often harmed
by the racism of individual citizens (e.g., through racial insults,
contemptuous attitudes, and various other modes of devaluation) and
the racist stances of private associations (e.g., white supremacist
organizations and other associations hostile to the interests of racial
minorities). Moreover, currently within the United States, racism is
rarely publicly defended as an explicit political doctrine or
institutional rule, but nonetheless continues to inhere in the hearts
and minds of all too many American citizens.52 Because the overt
expression of racist beliefs and attitudes is no longer publicly
acceptable, the effects of existing interpersonal racism are not so
readily observable and thus more intractable, though nevertheless
keenly felt by the victims of such covert forms of racial contempt. It
might therefore be thought that Rawls's theory fails to account for
important race-based moral wrongs, forms of wrongdoing that
arguably could be considered types of social injustice or at least
contributors to such injustice.53 In one sense, this assessment is
51. But see McGary, supra note 6, at 119-22.
52. See Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a
Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in Racial Attitudes in the 1990s, at 15-41 (Steven
A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997); Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare:
Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (1999); Tali Mendelberg, The
Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (2001).
53. See, e.g., Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But...": The Moral Quandary
of Race (2002); J.L.A. Garcia, The Heart of Racism, 27 J. of Soc. Phil. 5 (1996). But
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absolutely correct. Rawls does not give much attention to the conduct
or character of individuals or private associations. But this is not as
damaging an omission as it might initially seem, if it is a weakness at
all.
Rawls's theory takes the basic structure as its primary subject, not
just because he wants to limit the scope of his project to classical
problems of social justice, but also because the basic structure has a
"profound and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its
institutions. 5 4 It is largely through the mediation of institutions that
the social, natural, and fortuitous contingencies that mark differences
between persons come to affect the overall life prospects of
individuals in society. Justice as fairness seeks to insure that the life
prospects of citizens are not unfairly limited by contingencies that are
morally arbitrary. As we have observed, the fact that a person is a
member of a particular racial group is not a morally relevant
distinction from the standpoint of basic justice, and thus no one's life
prospects should be circumscribed because of his or her racial identity.
Thus, if the basic structure of a society is well-ordered and just, then
even if racist beliefs and attitudes continue to circulate in this society,
these beliefs and attitudes should not inhibit any person, regardless of
race, from fully participating in the society as an equal citizen, with all
the accompanying liberties and opportunities. Nor would the
existence of individual racism be an obstacle to any person's effective
choice and active pursuit of a rational plan of life under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity. So, while the fact that some individuals
harbor racist attitudes would still be a moral problem of some
concern, were the overall system of social cooperation a just one or
nearly so, this disturbing problem would not be such an urgent
practical matter from the standpoint of disfavored racial groups. In
this way, justice as fairness, if fully realized in a well-ordered society,
would sharply reduce the influence of individuals' racist misdeeds and
attitudes on the life prospects of other citizens. There is of course no
way to realize such a well-ordered society without also sharply
reducing the incidence of individual racism and containing the
offensive activities of racist organizations. For as we have said, racial
prejudice and bias, if not effectively combated, can lead to unjust
forms of discrimination within the basic structure, even to institutional
racism. But the establishment of a just and well-ordered society does
not require that individual racism be altogether extinct, as desirable as
that state of affairs would be. The complete eradication of all forms
of racism, overt and covert, is probably more than a "realistic utopia"
see Tommie Shelby, Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory, 34 Phil. F. 153
(2003); Tommie Shelby, Is Racism in the "Heart"?, 33 J. Soc. Phil. 411 (2002); Tommie
Shelby, Review of "I'm Not a Racist, But..." by Lawrence Blum, 112 Phil. Rev.
(forthcoming 2003) (book review).
54. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 55.
2004] 1713
1714 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
can hope to achieve, which is not of course to deny that this is a moral
goal well worth striving, even fighting, for.
